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Summary 
Since the mid-seventies a crisis has developed in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This paper reviews the 
symptoms of the crisis, grouped under i) deterioration of 
growth performance, ii) external imbalance, iii) internal 
imbalance, and outlines an _explanatory model of the 
functioning of Soviet-type economies, which embodies their 
' 
specific systemic features (in particular the central-
isation of political power and economic decision-making, 
and the systemic commitment to economic growth, full 
_employment and price stability) and is capable of generating 
economic and political cycles of the kind experienced by 
Eastern countries. The implications for East-West relations 
are al.so considered; the combined effect of e·conomic crisis 
in both systems is claimed to be exercising a positive 
influence on those relations, especially in Europe. 

ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EASTERN EUROPE 
PROSPECTS AND REPERCUSSIONS* 
Domenico Mario NUTI 
1. Introduction 
There is an old Polish saying that the main advantage 
of socialist planning is that it solves successfully all those 
problems which without socialist planning would not arise. This 
may appear as an instance of Polish cynicism but in reality is 
both an understatement and .an overstatement. It is an under-
statement because it neglects the contribution of socialist 
planning to the industrialisation, urbanisation, price 
I . 
stability, full employment and social progress of one third of 
the globe; since the last War there has been no period in which 
the growth of income and industrial output in the socialist 
countries (or "centrally planned economies" iri United Nations 
parlance) as a group has been exceeded by the groups of 
advanced c.apitalist economies or developing countries. It is 
also, however, an overstatement because the development process 
of socialist countries has generated new problems, conflicts 
~nd contradictions which the system has not yet been able to 
solve. Since the mid.-seventies a crisis has developed in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, not only in the broad 
senseof deterioration of economic performance, stagnation or 
even decline, but in the strictet sense of a phase of a cycle, 
due to the relative weight of demands and resources, and 
deeply rooted in the specific systemic features of these 
economies, namely the centralisation of political power and 
economic decision-making, and the sys·temic conuni tment to 
economic growth, full employment and price stability. 
!t A lecture ..given at the European Univers.i ty Institute, 
Florence, ori 20 April 1982. 
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In my lecture I review the symptoms of this crisis, 
outline an explanatory model of the functioning of these 
economies and how they generate crises; I then consider the 
implications of current trends for the West in general and 
Western Europe in particular. 
2. Symptoms of economic crisis 
In its most spectacular form economic crisis has 
manifested itself in Poland: accelerating decline of income, 
down by 15 per cent in 1981 and still falling, 40 per cent 
unutilised capacity and rising redundancy of labour, mounting 
external indebtedness of the order of $ 30 billion with over 
100 per cent debt-service ratio and de facto default in inter-
national financial commitments, open and repressed inflation 
at accelerating rates, endemic and growing shortages, ration-
ing and queues, the collapse of the central management of the 
economy. The economic crisis gave rise to massive political 
unrest, the conquest of political rights unprecedented in 
Eastern Europe, and then military rule. Let me say now that 
Poland is a unique phenomenon deeply rooted in a thousand 
years of national history and not to be repeated in the fore-
seeable future in the rest of the socialist commonwealth. But 
the same kind of symptoms, to a lesser and varied extent, have 
manifested themselves throughout the area, and can be grouped 
under the headings of: i) deteriorating growth performance, 
ii) external imbalance and iii) internal imbalance; with 
equally important political implications, though less drastic 
than in Poland. 
i) The deteriorating growth performance is clear 
from yearly plans in 1976-81 envisaging income growth rates 
lower than originally postulated in the five year plans, and 
at a decreasing rate over the period; and from actual growth 
rates being systematically lower than planned and also 
recording a decreasing trend over the period. The only 
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	 less drastic 
than in Poland.  
i) The deteriorating growth performance is clear from yearly plans in 
1976-81 envisaging income growth rates 
lower than originally postulated in the five year plans, and 
at a decreasing rate over the period; and from actual growth 
rates being systematically lower than planned and also 
recording a decreasing trend over the period. The only 
exception is 1977 in Hungary and the German Democratic 
Republic, where plans slightly more ambitious than in the 
previous year were realised. It is true that Bulgaria and 
the GDR maintained their growth, in spite of plan under-
fulfilment, around the appreciable rates of 6 and 4 per 
cent a year; but the slowdown was much steeper in other 
countries (in 1981 growth rates were 3.1 per cent in the 
Soviet Union, 2.1 per cent in Romania, 1.8 per cent in 
Hungary, 0.2 per cent in Czechoslovakia) and negative growth 
was recorded not only in Poland in 1979-81 but also in 
Hungary in 1980 (-0.8 per cent), far from the earlier 
record, five year plans and scaled down yearly targets. 
Identical trends can be found in industrial production; 
while agricultural output, which in the ten years up to 
1983 had increased at an average 5 per cent per year, in 
the following five years slowed down to 3 per cent, declined 
in 1979, to recover slightly in 1980-81. Current plans 
confirm these trends. 
This deteriorating growth performance is particularly 
disappointing in view of the massive accumulation of capital 
undertaken throughout the area, with the share of gross capital 
formation in national income rising until the mid-1970s up to 
levels of 30-40 per cent, with peaks of 45 per cent (Poland 
1975), and the policy of technology transfer from the West 
pursued by means of massive imports of machinery by the Soviet 
Union and other countries (especially Poland and Hungary, 
though much less so by the more advanced GDR and Czechoslovakia). 
The mirror image of this performance is the 
generalised increase in capital/output ratios, the slowdown and 
occasional fall in labour productivity, the increasing 
inefficiency in the allocation of resources. Microeconomic 
inefficiency has always been a widely recognised feature of 
the socialist economy, thought to be compensated for by macro-
economic rationality, but the suggestion of increasing overall 
inefficiency is substantiated by the observation of 
increasing overcapacity, i.e. unemployment of capital, the 
dispersion of investment means over a widening front of 
unfinished projects, and unused or even uninstalled machinery 
(subject to obsolescence and physical deterioration) often 
imported at great expense (Poland, Czechoslovakia). There are 
other concrete indications of increasing inefficiency, such 
as the continued growth in energy consumption per capita, at 
3.2 per cent per year in 1974-78 (with respect to 3.6 per cent 
in 1971-73), whereas in the same period it fell by 0.2 per 
cent in developed market economies (with respect to 3.1 per 
cent yearly increase in 1971-73); leading to a consumption of 
energy per unit of output in CMEA countries roughly double 
that of OECD countries by the end of the decade; clearly the 
failure to respond to increasing energy scarcity can only be 
interpreted as increasing inefficiency. 
ii) The second symptom of economic crisis is the 
widening external imbalance, in the form of recurring trade 
deficits and mounting cumulative foreign indebtedness. In 
1976-81 the trade balance of the six Eastern European countries 
with non-CMEA countries has been negative every year (with the 
exception of Bulgaria in 1977-80 and Czechoslovakia in 1980). 
In 1970-79 the Soviet Union has run trade surpluses with 
developing countries and slightly smaller trade deficits with 
the developed West, but since only about a third of its surplus 
was in convertible currencies it has needed hard currency 
finance. In 1980 the Soviet Union registered over $ 200 million 
surplus with the developed West (and $ 2.7 billion with less 
developed countries) but in 1981 the situation has changed 
drastically, leading to a $ 3 billion deficit with the West 
and $ 0.4 billion deficit with less developed countries. Between 
1976 and 1981 the total hard currency debt of the six Eastern 
European currencies more than trebled, to $ 65 billion (about 
ten times their total debt in 1970s; the prudent limit of 40 
per cent debt-service ratio recommended by the IMF was over-
stepped in 1980 by Poland, Hungary, GDR and Bulgaria, while 
Poland in 1981-82 and Romania in 1982 have effectively defaulted, 
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though have not been declared officially to have done so. 
Together with the Soviet Union, also facing a severe cash 
shortage, total debt exceeds $ 75 billion, while access to 
fresh credits and even rolling-over facilities is limited 
by bankers' reluctance to raise their exposure, due to 
political pressure and loss of confidence in the so-called 
"umbrella theory", whereby the USSR would ultimately 
guarantee loans to the entire area. The burden of debt is 
exacerbated by its time-structure dominated by short-term 
maturities which have to be renewed at rising interest 
rates and subject these countries to the continuous 
scrutiny of their affairs by bankers; and by the combination 
of inflation and high interest rates which involves "front-
-loading" or the "bunching" of the service burden in the 
early years of indebtedness, with respect to the burden 
which the same real interest rate would have for a lower 
rate of inflation. 
While it is inappropriate to single out individual 
trade flows in order to explain the rising indebtedness, it 
is interesting to note the gradually falling energy net 
export (mostly Soviet), the mounting food deficit (from 1976 
anwards in the six East European countries, from 1972 
onwards in the area including the Soviet Union), the large 
scale machinery imports by CMEA countries (quintupled over 
the 1970s for a cumulative amount of almost $ 100 billion, 
though slightly declining since 1978), the increasing East 
European dependence on the West for raw materials and semi-
-finished products (as well as massive hidden subsidies by 
the Soviet Union to East European countries through the 
underpricing of Soviet oil exports to them caused by CMEA 
pricing rules for infrabloc trade). 
iii) Internal imbalance has taken several alter-
native or simultaneous forms: open inflation; hidden 
inflation due to forced substitution of cheap products, 
rationed or simply unavailable, by more expensive 
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substitutes, whether provided by the official or the 
"unofficial" or "black" markets; repressed inflation, in the 
form of large and increasing excess liquid balances in the 
hands of the population, as well as a progressive squeeze on 
the share of gross profits on turnover. Since the post-war 
monetary reforms, in 1955-75 open inflation had become an 
almost forgotten phenomenon in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, but in the second half of the 1970s (more recently in 
the Soviet Union and the GDR) it has returned at slow but 
increasing pace (especially if hidden price rises are 
included); though hyperinflationary rates have only been 
seen in Poland after the military attempted the restoration 
of monetary equilibrium. The question "Will there be money 
under communism?" has two alternative answers in Russian 
folklore: "There will only be money" and "There will be money 
for some but not for others"; in the last few years socialist 
countries have come perilously close to both answers, with 
endemic shortages of essential goods as well as luxuries, and 
unequal access to scarce goods through either official 
privilete or unofficial exchange. 
In each period the current imbalance between 
intended expenditure and the mass of goods and services 
provided for the population, valued at official prices - the 
"inflationary gap" - is added to the "inflationary overhang" 
that is the sum of past inflationary gaps cumulated over 
time. While the precise calculation of intended expenditure 
(and therefore of inflationary gaps) raises controversial 
methodological problems, and the mere presence of excess 
demand (queues, rationing) should not necessarily be 
identified with repressed inflation (which is an increase in 
the rate of excess demand) we can nevertheless, from the 
observed rise in monetary balances held by the population 
with respect to current income, infer a progressively widen-
ing gap between actual and desired monetary balances of the 
population. Even for a falling inflationary gap the 
inflationary overhang increases over time, and this cumulative 
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problem exercises a destabilising influence on the orderly 
distribution of consumption goods and services; shortages 
have a strong demoralising effect and adversely affect 
productivity through time-wasting search and queueing and 
through the weakening of monetary incentives; moreover, 
they lead to the population hoarding more consumption goods 
and distort consumption patterns. Sooner or later, through 
derived demand for competing inputs or through international 
trade, inflationary pressure spills over from the consumption 
goods sector to production goods, leading to shortages of 
supplies to production enterprises. Shortages have a 
multiplier effect, in that one rouble of missing component 
may lead to a chain reaction of disruptions in other supplies 
to production enterprises down the line; this "supply 
multiplier" effect is growing all the time with the growing 
complexity of internal and international division of labour, 
and is only alleviated by a tendency towards vertical 
integration within the industrial system (which is most 
advanced in the GDR model but is an observable trend through-
out the area). Shortages also promote the growth of the non-
-socialist sector, composed of a private sector, a straight 
criminal economic sector, as well as a "second" or "informal" 
sector in different shades of grey, intermediate between the 
official private and the criminal sphere, where unplanned 
(or rather a-planned) transactions take place. This "second" 
economy, however, is an integral part of the system, which is 
why it is tolerated and occasionally encouraged. There are 
innumerable examples of the "privatisation" of state power 
on the part of people invested with that power, for their own 
benefit and that of their proteges. The problem is not the 
excessive power of the state, as claimed by critics of Soviet-
-type alleged "state capitalism" or "state socialism", but a 
quasi-feudal fragmentation and devolution of state power, 
with interlocking small and large fiefs rigidly set in an 
ossified structure, at odds with social justice and economic 
efficiency. 
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The economic crisis and its visible side-effects 
generate, at the same time, pressure for economic and 
political change. For a quarter of a century there have 
been numerous attempts, in the Eastern European countries 
and the Soviet Union, at relaxing central planning and 
introducing greater enterprise autonomy; market rather than 
planned discipline; profit-linked investment and material 
incentives. The extraordinary thing is that these attempts 
have not succeeded and reform projects either remained dead 
letter or failed and were reversed. (The only exception seems 
to be Hungary, where the so-called New Economic Mechanism was 
introduced in 1968 and has done relatively well, though the 
system, even there, has a tendency to revert to the original 
Soviet-type model under economic pressure). The same thing is 
true of political reform: economic failure undermines the 
legitimacy of the system, breeds dissent and leads to pressure 
for political democratisation and liberalisation; historically 
moves in this direction accompany, with leads or lags, trends 
towards economic reform, and also revert towards the 
authoritarian model sooner or later. Poland, again, is the 
most spectacular instance of such a reversal. 
• 	 We now have a number of important questions: Why is 
there an economic crisis in Eastern Europe? Why is there no 
stable progress towards economic and political reform? Can the 
system generate alternative solutions? Or is it doomed? 
3. A model of socialist development 
Soviet and East-European literature talks of 
"disproportions" and "imbalances" instead of crisis, and relies 
primarily on three explanations: i) exogenous factors, such as 
natural disasters and the world crisis; ii) the wickedness or 
incompetence of individuals, to be found and punished; iii) the 
switch from intensive to intensive growth in East-European 
development. There is no doubt that "crisis" is what these 
most spectacular instance of such a reversal. 
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generate, at the same time, pressure for economic and 
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We now have a number of important questions: Why is 
there an economic crisis in Eastern Europe? Why is there no 
stable progress towards economic and political reform? Can the 
System generate alternative solutions? Or is it doomed? 
3. A model of socialist develo ment 
Soviet and East-European literature talks of 
"disproportions" and "imbalances" instead of crisis, and relies 
Primarily on three explanations: i) exogenous factors, such as 
natural disasters and the world crisis; ii) the wickedness or 
incompetence of individuals, to be found and punished; Ili) the 
switch from intensive to intensive growth in East-European 
development. There is no doubt that "crisis" is what these  
dubious euphemisms stand for, and that the factors suggested 
while have substantial weight do not add up to a total 
explanation. 
Natural disasters like droughts and floods, ice 
and heat waves beyond reasonable expectations have taken 
place and have had an adverse effect (especially in Poland 
and the USSR) on harvests, building and transport, but they 
were not so unpredictable; moreover their effects have been 
amplified by persistent underinvestment in these sectors 
and by systemic problems, especially in agriculture. The 
energy crisis has affected the export prospects of East 
European countries but they have shown no flexibility in 
adapting to new conditions; besides, the Soviet Union is a 
net oil exporter and directly benefited through its terms 
of trade, Poland was a net energy exporter and through coal 
sustained its terms of trade (actually improving them in 1974), 
and East European countries had at least three years notice 
before being exposed to dearer oil. The incompetence of 
decision makers must be regarded as a systemic feature in 
view of the numbers involved, and a selection system based 
on party nomination to crucial posts (nomenklatura)  instead 
of professional merit. As for the switch to intensive develoE 
ment, the exhaustion of labour reserves and natural resources 
has certainly raised the cost of growth and possibly acted as 
triggering factor for economic problems: however, if this 
were all it would be difficult to understand why economic 
reforms have failed'to produce a system more suitable to the 
"intensive" stage of socialist development. 
I suggest a more complex model of socialist develop-
ment which embodies these factors, and others, in a pattern of 
behavioural regularities, conflicts and contradictions, which 
are capable of generating a crisis of the type just reviewed, 
as well as a more attractive potential course. It is a model 
of the possible "laws of motion" of a socialist system, which 
applies, among other things, Marxian methods to a Marxian-
-inspired system, with a vengeance. 
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The construction of the model procedes from the 
following empirical observations, or "stylised facts" of 
socialist development: 
i) there is a connection between political central-
isation and economic centralisation; to start with the 
establishment of one-party rule and "democratic centralism" 
leads to the centralised Soviet-type model; subsequently 
forms of political democratisation are "associated with" 
(i.e. without asserting a one-directional causal link) 
economic decentralisation; 
ii) economic centralisation is associated with 
microeconomic inefficiency in the allocation of resources, 
for the choice of production methods, their technical 
application, and the choice of consumption structure; 
iii) economic and political centralisation leads to 
a bias towards capital accumulation. First, at all levels the 
same urge to accumulate typical of the capitalist system is 
present, but without the checks and constraints of that 
system (such as stock market valuation of enterprise assets, 
takeover bids, bankruptcy discipline). Second, overoptimistic 
expectations about the system's ability to promote labour 
productivity raise investment requirements for the creation 
of new jobs over actual requirements. Third, in the course of 
communications and interactions between the various agents 
(Party, Gosplan, Ministries, firms associations and firms) 
strategies are developed that result in ambitious investment 
policies. 
iv) As long as there are labour and material 
reserves, the capital accumulation bias of the system 
generates fast economic growth, outweighing the disadvantages 
of microeconomic inefficiency and ultimately leading to "full 
employment", in the strict sense of exhaustion of labour and 
material reserves (thus, for instance, not only full 
employment of those willing and able to work, but high 
industrialisation and urbanisation). 
11 
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As long as there are labour and material 
reserves, the capital accumulation bias of the system 
generates fast economic growth, outweighing the disadvantages 
of microeconomic inefficiency and ultimately leading to "full 
employment", in the strict sense of exhaustion of labour and 
material reserves (thus, for instance, not only full 
employment of those willing and able to work, but high 
industrialisation and urbanisation). 
v) at "full employment", so defined, capital 
accumulation comes up against increasing costs of economic 
growth; also when the full employment is hit there are echo 
repercussions throughout the economy which make for 
fluctuations and some instability. The microeconomic 
inefficiency of the system becomes more serious, in that at 
full employment wasting the same amount of labour and 
materials becomes "more" inefficient than before full 
employment. Thus full employment adds to pressure for 
economic reform. In principle, an economic reform could 
take place, encouraging political democratisation which in 
turn would encourage further decentralisation and so on 
until market socialism and socialist democracy are 
established, in the best of all possible worlds. Why does 
this not happen? Because the accumulation bias and full 
employment also have adverse effects: 
vi) in the absence of automatic checks, the 
persistence of accumulation bias at full employment causes 
overaccumulation. Accumulation can be excessive not, or 
not only, with respect to the time preferences of the 
population, or other plausible but intangible benchmarks; 
accumulation can be said to have been excessive in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union with respect to the interests 
of maintainable consumption (investment leading to higher 
income streams but not higher consumption streams in the 
future); with respect to the absorption capacity of the 
system (investment being "frozen" in work-in-progress for 
longer gestation periods than necessary, or machines un-
installed or unused); with respect to the ability of the 
system of financing both internally and externally the 
capital expenditure and the recurring costs of operation; 
with respect to the preferences expressed by the leadership 
in their own plans, since often the sum of investment plans 
adds up to more than the centrally planned level of invest-
ment, and those plans are systematically overfulfilled. 
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Even when investment is slowed down (as in the second half 
of the 1970s) unless the slowdown is planned long in 
advance (which it was not) investment continues to be 
excessive and contributes to excess demand. 
vii) Full employment of labour, in spite of wage 
norms and an incomes policy directed at maintaining broad 
macroeconomic balance in consumption markets, leads to wage 
drift (through informal bargaining at the factory level) 
and adds to excess demand; 
viii) the built-in tendencies towards excess 
demand in both production and consumption markets are 
aggravated, or alleviated, by the net effects of exogenous 
factors and their change over time: the volume of world 
trade, terms of trade, the volume and terms of international 
loans, defence expenditure, agricultural harvests, the pace 
of technical advance, the exhaustion or discovery of natural 
resources. It would require a permanently favourable balance 
of these factors to offset the underlying excess demand, 
which is utterly unrealistic; 
ix) in view of the systemic commitment to price 
stability, enshrined in the theory and practice of socialist 
countries where prices are raised only under the most 
formidable demand and cost pressure, normally excess demand 
generates shortages, which cumulate over time and through 
spillover effects disrupt the system of management and plan-
ning of the national economy; shortages and disruption 
generate pressure towards greater and not lesser central-
isation, and the application of war-type methods of 
rationing, priorities and direct control; 
x) the coexistence of pressure to reform (due to 
inefficiency and instability), shortages and pressure to 
centralise leads to an impasse: either the pressure to 
centralise is stronger than the reform drive, and there is 
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Spillover effects disrupt the system of management and plan- 
ning of the national economy; shortages and disruption 
generate pressure towards greater and not lesser central-
isation, and the application of war-type methods of 
rationing, priorities and direct control; 
x) 
the coexistence of pressure to reform (due to 
inefficiency and instability), shortages and pressure to 
centralise leads to an impasse: either the pressure to 
centralise is stronger than the reform drive, and there is 
no reform, or the reform drive is stronger and a reform 
takes place in conditions of shortages and excess demand 
which doom it to fail. The system is locked into a vicious 
circle of stagnation and waste. 
This is not, however, the end of the story. 
Shortages, inefficiency and instability lead to mounting 
discontent and political unrest. This eventually affects 
the level of political centralisation, but the impact can 
go either way: sustained political pressure may induce 
democratisation, but if pressure goes beyond a critical 
noint it is perceived as a challenge to the system and it 
may well induce an authoritarian involution. The lesson 
of the recent Polish experience is not that political 
change is impossible, but that it is touch and go whether 
sustained political pressure leads to democratisation or 
military rule. 
The system can, or at any rate it would be rash 
and unwarranted to claim that it cannot, break out of its 
vicious circle by the weakening of any of the perverse 
links: autonomous political democratisation as in the 
Soviet Union in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1967-68; 
economic reforms timed to coincide with favourable 
exogenous factors, as in Hungary in 1968; a relaxation of 
the system's commitment to full employment, as advocated 
by Dr Popov of the Moscow Academy of Sciences Institute 
of Management; a relaxation of the system's commitment to 
price stability, which seems to be taking place throughout 
the area, and which would prepare a better environment for 
economic reform; last but not least the possibility of 
political pressure being directed not at opposing the 
system but at negotiating political democratisation in 
exchange for the acceptance of austerity, as might have 
happened in Poland if both trade unionists and government 
had had more sense. It may be overoptimistic to expect 
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rapid and drastic changes along these lines in the near 
future in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but it is 
plainly wrong to expect that the system is incapable of 
changing, or to expect its collapse. 
4. Implications for the West 
The same kind of symptoms of economic crisis and 
prospects are also shared by and large by capitalist 
countries: deterioration of growth performance, external 
and internal imbalance; it is also a cyclical phenomenon 
rooted in the systemic features of capitalism. Some of the 
causes are common to both groups: the world energy crisis 
and concomitant inflation and recession in world trade; 
poor labour relations and the failure to reach a social 
pact between government and workers. But other causes, the 
actual mechanisms, depth and specific features of the 
crisis, however, are profoundly different. In particular, 
capitalist countries face macroeconomic constraints 
internally and internationally instead of structural 
capacity constraints; they have unemployment of labour as 
well as unemployment of capital, and instead of several 
queues for commodities they have one single and long queue 
for jobs, people being unable to buy money with their labour 
(which is even worse than being unable to buy goods with 
money because unspent labour cannot be saved for later 
expenditure). 
These specific differences suggest that there is a 
certain degree of complementarity between the crises 
affecting different systems. This complementarity generates 
opportunities for foreign trade and capital movements of a 
kind which has nothing to do with conventional Heckscher-Ohlin 
type international trade theory, i.e. with relative factor 
endowments and even relative market prices, but is neverthe- 
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crisis, however, are profoundly different. In particular, 
capitalist countries face macroeconomic constraints 
internally and internationally instead of structural 
capacity constraints; they have unemployment of labour as 
well as unemployment of capital, and instead of several 
queues for commodities they have one single and long queue 
for jobs, people being unable to buy money with their labour 
(which is even worse than being unable to buy goods with 
money because unspent labour cannot be saved for later expenditure). 
These specific differences suggest that there is a 
certain degree of complementarity between the crises 
affecting different systems. This complementarity generates 
opportunities for foreign trade and capital movements of a 
kind which has nothing to do with conventional Heckscher-Ohlin 
type international trade theory, i.e. with relative factor 
endowments and even relative market prices, but is neverthe- 
less a tangible form of comparative advantages. The sale 
by the West of advanced technology, grain, foodstuffs, 
steel, semifinished goods, contributes to solving East 
European structural problems of mismatching of demand and 
supply, while the sale of anything can relieve the overall 
pressure of excess demand discussed earlier, at a lower 
social than private cost to the West in view of large scale 
unemployment and spare capacity. These sales can activate 
capacity utilisation in the East, with supply-multiplier 
positive effects, and generate additional goods which 
would enable the East to recover and pay, sooner or later, 
for what they have received. The problem is that short of 
mounting a gigantic multilateral intertemporal barter 
operation, which is impracticable, the benefits of this 
complementarity between economic systems can only be reaped 
by the provision of large scale credit, which is not 
impossible but requires a degree of international co-
operation, goodwill, and development of financial 
institutions which is simply not there. Economic factors, 
however, would amply reward East and West for any effort 
aimed at trade promotion and credit expansion. 
Any move in the opposite direction, in the form 
of trade embargoes, credit restrictions, refusal to 
reschedule debt and demands for formal declarations of 
default for the worst affected countries like Poland and 
Romania, has an economic cost for both the West and the 
East and has a destabilising effect on the economic/ 
/political cycle of socialist countries, through the 
aggravation of shortages, inefficiencies and economic 
disorganisation. President Reagan believes that the 
economic cost to the West of trade denial and credit 
denial in economic relationswith the East is worth paying 
in order to expose and enhance the economic difficulties 
of the socialist bloc, to force political democratisation 
in socialist countries, especially the USSR and Poland. 
On this, three final observations are offered: 
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First, the cause of democratisation in Eastern 
Europe is better served by trade and credit expansion than 
restriction; the economic difficulties of these countries 
are already sufficient to generate political pressure. By 
aggravating these difficulties through arms races and 
economic warfare the diffusion of authoritarian solutions 
throughout the bloc is more likely than democratisation. If, 
for instance, Western assistence had been made available to 
Poland in 1981, instead of Western banks cutting almost their 
entire short term credits in the spring of that year, the 
Polish economy would not have collapsed and the state of 
emergency would have been appreciably less likely. 
Second, while both East and West stand to gain 
considerably from economic cooperation in trade and loans, 
Western economic warfare could cost the West a great deal 
and would not hurt socialist economies much. For instance, 
embargo on the Soviet gas pipeline construction would cost 
the West at least $ 10 billion machinery exports but would 
only temporarily delay the project, actually improving 
Soviet cash flow in the short run. High technology sales to 
the Soviet Union no longer contribute as much as they used 
to to Soviet productivity growth. The formal declaration of 
Polish default would seriously affect Western banking 
circles (especially if the possibility of deposit withdrawals 
from the most affected banks are considered) and lead to the 
write-off of Polish debt and the loss of current interest 
payments, but Poland could continue to trade on a balanced 
basis for cash, through friendly intermediaries and 
alternative transport routes, the higher cost of inter-
mediation being offset by the relief from interest payments. 
In spite of appearances, the socialist countries are not so 
vulnerable to Western warfare. 
Finally, the considerable cost to the West of trade 
and credit denial would fall much more heavily on Western 
Europe than on the United States. For instance, out of the 
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Polish default would seriously affect Western banking 
circles (especially if the possibility of deposit withdrawals 
from the most affected banks are considered) and lead to the 
write-off of Polish debt and the loss of current interest 
payments, but Poland could continue to trade on a balanced 
basis for cash, through friendly intermediaries and 
alternative transport routes, the higher cost of inter- 
mediation being offset by the relief from interest payments. 
In spite of appearances, the socialist countries are not so 
vulnerable to Western warfare. 
Finally, the considerable cost to the West of trade 
and credit denial would fall much more heavily on Western 
Europe than on the United States. For instance, out of the 
25 bn of Polish debt to the West, less than 4 bn represent 
the maximum US exposure both direct and through government 
guarantees. The bulk of machinery sales for the Soviet gas 
pipeline would be commissioned to Europe, while Soviet gas 
would reduce European dependence from OPEC countries and 
broaden European energy options. US exports of high 
technology to the USSR are of the order of $ 150 mn a year, 
i.e. half those of Italy and France, and a fifth of West 
German sales. The disparity between the US and Western 
Europe is just as bad in the general field of manufacturing 
products. There is a significant unfairness in the 
distribution of costs of Reaganite policies between the US 
and its European allies, which justifies the visible 
European reluctance to follow the US lead. 
In conclusion, the combined effect of economic 
crisis East and West is exercising a sobering and positive 
influence on East-West relations, especially in Europe. 
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